Sherman V. Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. : Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1961
Sherman V. Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. :
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Oman & Saperstein; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent and Cross-Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., No. 9389 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3867
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F 1 L E 
SHERMAN V. LUND, 
. ~ D 3 1 ·: l u~ ... , L :-, - , ., 
Plaintiff, Respondent, and-~ . .-.. -$~~-;~ .. .- .-· -c~ ... -.. -~-i~;;--~---­
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 
9389 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COM-
PANY, Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
OMAN & SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT _ ----------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ----------·---------------------------------------- 6 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ---------------------------------- 6 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY EVEN AS-
SUMING THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A STAND-
DARD AS TO THE PROPER DEPTH AT WHICH 
APPELLANT'S PIPELINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
INSTALLED OR PERMITTED TO REMAIN.______________ 6 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY CONTAINED IN IN-
STRUCTION NO. 6. -------------------------------------------------------- 11 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITURE.________________ 14 
CON CL USI 0 N ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
CASES CITED 
Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 
3 57 P .2d (Utah 1960) -------------------------------------------------- 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Badon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958) -------------- 16 
Graves v. May Dept. Stores Co., 153 S.W. 2d 778 
(Mo. A pp. 1941) ---------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Hadley v. Wood, 345 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah 1959) ________ 12, 14 
Harris v. Central P. Co., 109 Neb. 500, 191 N.W. 711 
( 192 2) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 525______ 9 
Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v Williams, 103 Tex 228, 
12 5 S. W. 881 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co., 332 P.2d 666 
( U tab 19 58) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Renolds v. May Dept. Stores Co., 127 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 
194 2 ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Zinnel v. U. S. Shipping Bd. E. F. Corp., 10 F.2d 47 
( 2d Cir. 182 5, per L. Hand) ---------------------------------------- 10 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Harper & James, Vol. 2, The Law of Torts, 1956, Sec. 17.L- 7, 9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN V. LUND, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COM-
PANY, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9389 
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Sherman V. Lund, the respondent herein, commenced this 
action against Mountain Fuel Supply Company, appellant, in 
the District Court of Davis County, Utah, seeking damages 
for losses sustained as a result of saturation by natural gas 
of the soil at his residential property situate in the City of 
Bountiful. From a jury verdict awarding damages to respondent 
in the amount of $1,800.00, Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
brings this appeal; and from the trial court's denial of re-
spondent's motion for an additure, respondent cross-appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the late spring and early summer of 1958, re-
spondent's beautifully landscaped yard, which had theretofore 
been regarded as the <(showplace" of the neighborhood (Tr. 
87), inexplicably began to show signs of abnormal plant 
behavior. Respondent's lawn turned yellow, his trees began 
to wither and die and his flowers failed to grow (Tr. 50, 71, 
72, 90) . At the suggestion of the County Agricultural agent, 
appellant's employees were summoned by respondent to the 
area and discovered a gas leak directly across the road from 
respondent's property at the precise point where the feeder 
pipeline supplying gas to respondent's premises was attached 
to appellant's main gas line (Tr. 13, 14, 183). At the point 
of the break, the main gas line was found to be only 16 inches 
below the surface of the ground, and the surface of the 
ground was found to be impressed with tire mark indentations 
approximately 12 inches in depth (Tr. 25). 
Upon initial examination of respondent's yard, appellant's 
agents found portions of the same fully saturated with gas 
(Tr. 51, 52, 53, 74, 195). Appellant's employees thereupon 
warned respondent and his wife about smoking and lighting 
lights (Tr. 52, 53, 54, 74), painted cautionary signs on and 
about the respondent's home and dug pits along each side 
of respondent's driveway to permit the gas in the ground to 
escape (Tr. 53, 54, 75, 95). Respondent's ground smelled 
of gas and en1itted visible gas fumes (Tr. 59, 85). Appellant's 
employees admitted that gas was present in respondent's soil 
and that natural gas has a deleterious effect on plant life (Tr. 
195, 205, 219, 221, 222). The damage to respondent's property 
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as a result of the gas continued to be evident in varying degrees 
from the time of its initial discovery to the time of trial (Tr. 
51, 60, 61, 62, 65, 73, 79, 80, 96, 97). 
Appellant's main pipeline was installed in the area with 
which we are here concerned in 1947 (Tr. 12), was owned 
by appellant and under its exclusive management and control 
(Tr. 33, 189, 190). Appellant purports to maintain a regular 
inspection service of its lines (Tr. 39). The appellant's normal 
procedure is to install its pipes at least three feet below the 
ground ( T r. 3 3) ; however, after repairing the break dis-
covered in the instant case, appellant left the pipes at the 
same distance below the surface of the ground as they were 
at the time of the discovery of the leak (Tr. 56, 57, 79, 192), 
to wit: 16 inches (Tr. 25). 
Respondent acquired his property approximately seven 
years prior to the time of trial; and at the time of the acquisi-
tion, the home situate upon this property was several years 
old (Tr. 42). During the time of respondent's residence in the 
neighborhood, continuous residential construction had taken 
place in the area (Tr. 56, 77). 
The before and after value of respondent's premises were 
estimated by respondent and an expert appraiser called at re-
spondent's behest. Respondent estimated that the fair market 
value of his pren1ises immediately prior to the damage com-
plained of was $22,500.00 and he estimated the value of said 
premises to be $16,000.00-$17,000.00 after the damage had 
been fully inflicted (Tr. 63). Respondent's expert placed the 
fair market value of the property in question at $21,500.00 
immediately prior to the tnJury and $15,500.00 immediately 
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after the gas pollution had reached its fullest extent (Tr. 106). 
Appellant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company offered no evidence 
whatsoever relative to damages. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY EVEN ASSUM-
ING THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A STANDARD AS 
TO THE PROPER DEPTH AT WHICH APPELLANT'S 
PIPELINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTALLED OR PER-
MITTED TO REMAIN. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY CONTAINED IN INSTRUC-
TION NO.6. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITURE. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY EVEN ASSUM-
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lNG THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A STANDARD AS 
TO THE PROPER DEPTH AT WHICH APPELLANT'S 
PIPELINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTALLED OR PER-
MITTED TO REMAIN. 
Appellant contends that the evidence in the record of its neg-
ligence was insufficient to go to the jury because of the absence 
of proof of a standard prescribing the depth at which appel-
lant's pipeline should properly have been buried; that, conse-
quently, the view taken of the premises by the jury could not 
supply this standard; and because of the lack of such standard, 
appellant's motions to dismiss were improperly denied. 
At the outset, it is submitted that the propriety of this 
argument is questionable in the light of the evidence of record. 
Appellant's own employee, Mr. Makin, supplied the jury with 
the standard appellant now contends was lacking. Called as 
a hostile witness, he testified that it was ccnormal procedure" 
for appellant to bury its line at a depth of 3 feet (Tr. 33). 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the appellant's pipes 
at the point of break and leak were a mere 16 inches below 
the surface of the ground (Tr. 25). Viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to respondent, as this court is bound 
to do on appeal, it is submitted that the jury could readily 
have inferred that the appellant's pipes were originally in-
stalled and permitted to remain at that depth, to wit: 16 
inches. This conclusion is strengthened by the complete 
absence of any testimony on the matter proffered by appellant, 
and is further strengthened by appellant's own testimonial 
admission that the pipes were allowed to remain at that same 
depth, viz., 16 inches, even after the discovery of the leak 
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and the repair thereof (Tr. 192). Thus, from the testimony 
of appellant's agents and employees, the jury could not only 
infer the existence of the standard contended for, to wit: three 
feet; but the jury could also infer a clear violation thereof, 
to wit: 16 inches. 
Although appellant suggests that the main at the point 
of the break was originally imbedded in three feet of dirt and 
that some unknown person whom appellant never produced 
in court removed 20 inches of this cover while excavating a 
driveway (Tr. 39), it should be noted by this court that such 
evidence was simply the bare conclusions of appellant's em-
ployees, completely unsupported by any direct evidence. 
Because of the obvious self-interests of appellant's employees, 
testifying as they were in the presence of a superior official 
of the appellant company (Tr. 217, 218), the jury was not 
bound to accept their version of the facts, but on the contrary, 
was entitled to draw its own conclusions from the evidence. 
Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 357 
P .2d 496 (Utah 1960). 
But let us assume, arguendo only, the correctness of 
appellant's position that proof of a standard as to depth is 
lacking in the evidence. To substantiate this position, appellant 
attempts to analogize the determination of a proper depth 
below the surface at which to lay conduit pipe to the pro-
fessional skill and care required of a physician in administering 
to a patient. Stated another way, appellant argues that the 
amount of dirt required to adequately cover a metal pipe and 
thereby protect it from damage by external pressure from 
above is a matter so technical and dependent upon such com-
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plex scientific skill and knowledge that a layman must be 
presumed to know nothing about such things. Cf. Huggins v. 
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 524. The bare statement 
of this proposition reveals its inherent fallacy; even a small 
child burying toys in a sand pile has some appreciation as 
to how deep he must burrow! 
Harper & James, Vol. 2, The Law of Torts, 1956, Sec. 
17.1, states the general rule as follows: 
ttAs a general proposition it is not essential to a 
party's case that he prove or otherwise show what his 
opponent should have done under the circumstances. 
It is enough to show what he did and what the cir-
cumstances were. It is then for the jury to determine 
whether, in the light of their common experience in 
the affairs of men, they find he failed to act as a rea-
sonable man would have acted. This implies that 
there was some concrete thing that he could have done 
or omitted to do, and that such act or such omitted pre-
caution was reasonable and feasible, and would have 
· been effective to prevent injury under the circumstances. 
But if it is within the competence of men of affairs 
generally to make this judgment in a given case, the 
jury may make it even though there is no proof ... 
in the case which points directly to any specific pre-
caution that could reasonably have been taken and 
even though the jury themselves are not satisfied as 
to the precise nature of what ought to have been done. 
In this sense the jury need not fix or agree upon a 
standard of conduct of precaution to be taken, but 
need only find that the conduct of the party falls 
short of any standard which they would agree upon 
as reasonable. The jury's finding of negligence is thus 
always that the actor should not have acted as he did; 
this implies a finding that he should have acted other-
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wise, but not necessarily in any specific manner." 
(Emphasis is the author's.) 
* * * 
cccourts could very easily expand the area in which 
expert testimony is required to establish the standard 
of conduct, but the tendency has been instead to resolve 
doubtful questions in favor of allowing the jury to 
decide the issue of negligence without its aid." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Thus, it has been held that the question of whether a 
ship deck without guard or rail was a reasonably safe place 
to work, without proof of what good seamanship demanded 
under the circumstances, was properly for the jury. Zinnel 
v. U. S. Shipping Bd. E. F. Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925, 
per L. Hand) . The question of required clearance between 
a train and a mail crane, without testimony on the matter, 
was held properly for the jury in the case of Missouri K. &T. 
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 103 Tex. 228, 125 S.W. 881. The feasi-
bility of carrying electric wires on cross arms that protrude 
from one side of a pole only was held properly for the jury 
unaided by expert testimony in the case of Harris v. Central 
P. Co., 109 Neb. 500, 191 N.W. 711 (1922). The proper 
safeguards for the construction and operation of an escalator 
in a department store was likewise held to be a matter for 
the jury despite the absence of proof of a standard to guide 
it in the case of Reynolds v. May Dept. Stores Co., 127 F.2d 
396 (8th Cir. 1942). See also Graves v. May Dept. Stores Co., 
153 S.W. 2d 778 (Mo. App. 1941). 
It is submitted, therefore, that the question of whether 
16 inches or even three feet was a proper depth at which to 
bury an unencased metal pipe line, or a proper depth at which 
10 
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to permit such a line to remain, in an area bustling with 
residential construction and where one could reasonably antici-
pate heavy vehicular surface traffic was in any view of the 
evidence a question properly within the unaided competence 
of the jury to decide and the court below committed no error 
in permitting them to do so. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY CONTAINED IN INSTRUC-
TION NO.6. 
Appellant next assigns error to the court below in its 
charge to the jury contained in Instruction No. 6. Appellant 
attacks this instruction on three separate theories, to wit: ( 1) 
The instruction assumes that the seepage of gas in the plain-
tiff's yard was the cause of plaintiff's damage, although there 
was no proof of that ultimate fact in the record; ( 2) The 
instruction took from the jury the question of appellant's 
negligence; and ( 3) The instruction put to the jury the question 
of negligent installation when there was no proof that appel-
lant installed the pi pes and the instruction further allowed 
the jury to determine whether appellant was negligent in per-
mitting the pipes to remain too near the surface, although 
there was no proof of a standard to guide the jury in deciding 
what was a proper depth. 
With respect to appellant's first theory enumerated above, 
it is respectfully submitted that Instruction No. 6 does not 
take from the jury the question of causation. Interrogatories 
11 
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1-A and 2-C (R. 58, 60) of said Instruction, which is quoted 
in toto in appellant's brief, clearly require the jury to find that 
respondent's damage was nproximately caused by the seepage 
of gas in question." Moreover, appellant is not entitled to 
have this instruction construed in vacuo. Instruction Nos. 7 
and 8 (R. 61, 62) given to the jury by the trial court properly 
presented to the jury the issue of proximate cause and said 
Instruction No. 8 defined the same fully and fairly. This 
court has held time and again that instructions are to be viewed 
as a whole. Hadley v. Wood, 345 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah 1959). 
As to the contention that the record is devoid of proof of causa-
tion, the court is referred to the statement of facts contained 
in thi~ brief, which reveals in essence that respondent's yard 
noted for its lush and beautiful appearance (Tr. 87) suddenly 
and inexplicably ('Tr. 71) became "barren-like" (Tr. 90), 
the flowers and trees withered and died and the lawn became 
straw-like (Tr. 89, 90). Simultaneously with this change of 
condition in respondent's yard, a gas leak was discovered 
directly across the road from the yard and the yard was found 
to be saturated with gas (Tr. 14, 51, 52, 53, 74, 183, 195). 
Moreover, appellant stipulates at Page 10 of its brief that 
gas seeped into respondent's yard. It is submitted that from 
these facts alone the jury would be entitled to infer causation. 
However, appellant's own witness, Mr. Robinson, the Super-
intendent of Distribution for appellant (Tr. 218), supplied 
by his testimony any alleged deficiency in the evidence as to 
the poisonous character of natural gas. Note the following 
examination by Court and counsel of this witness (Tr. 222): 
nTHE COURT: Do you know the mechanics of death 
to the plant when they are affected by gas? 
12 
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A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Will you tell the jury what the me-
chanics of death is. 
A. The gas goes into the soil and dries out the soil and 
takes away the moisture and they dry up and wilt. 
THE COURT: Your witness. 
MR. OMAN: Does natural gas not enter moisture 
itself and be carried in suspension in water? 
A. Water enters the gas and goes along with the gas, 
the gas will absorb the moisture out of the soil. 
Q. So in the breathing process of the plant, part of that 
takes place in the roots, does it not? 
A. It could do. 
MR. OMAN: And the gas is entering the plant through 
that process through the synthesis of the plant and 
causes the plant to lose its ability to breathe. 
A. That is true. 
MR. OMAN: That is all. 
MR. CRAWFORD: That is all. 
THE COURT: I am curious then, why would a plant 
die left in the soil after the gas is removed? 
A. Well, because the gas is not out of the soil. * * * " 
With respect to appellant's second theory of attack 
enumerated above, suffice it to say that Instruction Nos. 7, 
9, 10 and 19 (R. 61, 63, 64, 73), given by the trial court to 
the jury, fully and fairly, and without exception taken thereto, 
presented the issue of negligence to the jury as did Interrogatory 
2-B (R. 60) embodied within the very instruction complained 
of. Moreover, Instruction 15 ( R. 69) clear! y admonished the 
13 
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jury that allegations of and instructions upon the question of 
damages are to be considered only after a finding of liability. 
Hadley v. Wood, supra. 
As to appellant's third contention enumerated above that 
there was no proof of installation of the pipes by appellant, 
it must be noted in considering this contention that the record 
clearly reflects that the line was installed in 1947 (Tr. 12), 
that although appellant sometimes may not install its own 
pipe, but may let a contract for its installation, installation in 
such cases is effected under the complete direction and super-
vision of the appellant, and the details of such installation are 
completely prescribed by appellant, even as to ccwhere" the 
line shall be put (Tr. 189, 190); moreover, the lines, including 
the feeder lines, are owned, maintained, inspected and con-
trolled absolutely and exclusively by the appellant (Tr. 33, 
190). It is submitted that the jury was entitled to infer from 
this evidence that any determination as to the depth or manner 
of installation was the determination of appellant and none 
other. It should further be noted in this connection that the fact 
of installation is a matter peculiarly within the sole knowledge 
of the appellant, yet it came forward with no evidence what-
soever to rebut the above inference. 
Appellant's argument that the court erred in allowing the 
jury absent testimony of a standard to determine appellant's 
negligence in permitting the pipe to remain too near the surface 
has been treated earlier in this brief. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITURE. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The measure of damages applied by the trial court in 
its charge to the jury is contained in the first paragraph of 
Instruction No. 6 (R. 58). The measure applied was the 
diminution in the value of the property in question resulting 
from the gas pollution complained of. 
The only testimony presented to the jury was that of 
respondent himself, who estimated the value of his property 
diminished at least $5,500.00 and that of respondent's duly 
qualified expert, Marcellus K. Palmer, who estimated that 
respondent's property diminished in value $6,000.00 as a result 
of appellant's gas pollution of respondent's premises (Tr. 63, 
106). Appellant offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict 
this testimony. 
The general rule was recent! y and succinct! y stated by this 
court in the case of Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co., 
332 P. 2d 666 (Utah, 1958) as follows: 
((The traditional and well established rule is: the 
fact trier, in this instance the jury, has the prerogative 
of judging credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given the evidence. This admittedly would not go 
so far as to permit it to arbitrarily disregard credible 
uncontradicted evidence. But wherever there is a basis 
from which bias, prejudice or self interest may be seen, 
or there is anything incredible in the testimony, the 
jury is not obliged to accept it." (Emphasis supplied). 
Certainly no basis is shown in the evidence here that Mr. 
Palmer was in any way biased or prejudiced for respondent 
or against appellant, nor can it be said that a diminution in 
the fair market value of respondent's land in the amount of 
$6,000.00 is incredible when viewed against the abundant 
15 
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evidence of plant damage and soil pollution, coupled with 
the constant danger of explosion requiring extreme care upon 
the part of the occupants of the premises involved (Tr. 52, 
54, 7 4, not to mention the consternation caused by this 
situation ( T r. 80, 100) , which, it is submitted, would be a 
substantial factor in and of itself in diminishing property 
values. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the jury by fixing damages in 
the amount of only $1,800.00 arbitrarily disregarded the only 
credible, uncontradicted evidence in the record and the trial 
court, therefore, erred in failing to grant respondent's motion 
for additure (R. 81, 82; Tr. 247). This court may cure such 
error on appeal. Badon v. SuhrmannJ 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 
1958). 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the jury below 
was entitled to determine the fact of appellant's negligence 
unaided by proof of any standard assuming, arguendo, that 
such proof was lacking; that the charge of the court contained 
in its Instruction No. 6 was in all respects proper; and that, 
therefore, the verdict returned by the jury and the judgment 
entered thereon should be affirmed and increased by additure 
by this court in the additional amount of $3,700.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OlviAN & SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
